New Security Cooperation in the Horn of Africa and Its Implications for Ethiopia

A significant new axis is forming in the Horn of Africa as Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea deepen security cooperation. The recent alignment, driven by shared grievances against Ethiopia, is reshaping regional dynamics, particularly in the context of Ethiopia's ambitions and its increasingly fraught relationships with its neighbors.

The key catalyst for this emerging alliance can be traced to the policies of Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed. His signing of a memorandum of understanding with Somaliland and his pursuit of military access to the sea have alarmed neighboring states. Ethiopia’s growing influence and Abiy’s ambitions to secure access to the Red Sea have brought these nations together, presenting new challenges for Addis Ababa.

Eritrea, which shares a contentious border with Ethiopia, could exploit its proximity and history of using proxy forces to destabilize its neighbor. The Eritrean regime’s strategic position and military capabilities may be used to inflame the already volatile Amhara region, further weakening Ethiopia’s internal stability. However, despite these threats, Ethiopia remains relatively isolated in the region, with its only significant ally being the UAE—a relationship largely based on personal ties between Abiy and UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed, rather than formal state-to-state cooperation.

Meanwhile, Somalia and Egypt have their own strategic motivations for joining this alliance. Egypt's concerns are largely centered around its historic dependence on the Nile River. The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which Ethiopia is building on the Blue Nile, has been a longstanding source of tension. Egypt views the dam as a threat to its water security, and its efforts to pressure Ethiopia through diplomacy have largely stalled. With no binding agreement on the dam, Egypt has sought to align itself with other countries that have their own disputes with Ethiopia.

Somalia, on the other hand, is reacting to Ethiopia’s agreement with Somaliland, a breakaway region that Somalia considers part of its territory. The agreement has deeply angered Mogadishu, which sees it as a violation of its sovereignty. The Somali government has even left open the possibility of renegotiating if Ethiopia backs away from the Somaliland deal. However, tensions remain high, and Somalia’s president, known for holding grudges, feels betrayed by Abiy Ahmed.

Eritrea's involvement in this alliance is particularly significant. The country has long-standing territorial disputes with Ethiopia, and while relations improved after the signing of a peace agreement in 2018, tensions have since resurfaced. Eritrea views Ethiopia’s ambitions to gain access to the Red Sea as a direct threat, and none of the nations involved in this new alliance want to see Ethiopia become a naval power in the region.

Despite the apparent cohesion of this new security bloc, the fluid nature of alliances in the Horn of Africa means the long-term implications remain uncertain. The region has seen rapid shifts in alliances before, most notably in 2018 when Ethiopia and Eritrea ended decades of conflict. Furthermore, Ethiopia’s strategic isolation could deepen if former U.S. President Donald Trump were to win the 2024 election. Trump’s previous remarks in 2020, suggesting Egypt could take extreme measures such as targeting the GERD to protect its interests, add another layer of uncertainty to Ethiopia’s precarious position.

While this new security cooperation could exacerbate tensions in the region, it is unlikely to lead to a sweeping geopolitical realignment. Both Ethiopia and Somalia remain fragile states with significant internal challenges. Somalia’s government, for example, struggles to maintain control outside Mogadishu and relies heavily on peacekeepers to combat the al-Shabab insurgency. The country’s federal states also have divergent loyalties, with some maintaining closer ties to Ethiopia than to Egypt.

International actors like Turkey, which has agreements with Somalia, are likely to tread cautiously. Turkey, unlike Egypt, has interests in both Ethiopia and Somalia and will likely avoid getting caught in the middle of a broader geopolitical conflict.

For Ethiopia, navigating this growing isolation will require careful diplomacy. One potential way to ease tensions would be for Addis Ababa to reconsider its agreements with Somaliland, which has been a major source of friction. However, it remains to be seen whether Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed will be willing to make such concessions, especially as his government faces growing internal and external pressures.

In sum, while the emerging cooperation between Egypt, Somalia, and Eritrea represents a significant shift in the Horn of Africa, its long-term impact on the region's geopolitical landscape remains uncertain. Ethiopia's isolation is deepening, but its capacity to navigate these emerging tensions will be critical in determining the future stability of the region.